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"GOD ALMIGHTY HAS SPOKEN FROM WASHINGTON,
D.C.": AMERICAN SOCIETY AND CHRISTIAN FAITH
Michael Eric Dyson*

As usual, Stanley Hauerwas (this time with Michael Baxter) has
given us a great deal to think about in wrestling with the persistent
problems growing out of the church-state debate. Arguing that there
are irresolvable tensions between American society and Christian
faith, the authors deliver a tough rebuke to those theologians who
"posit some kind of harmony between the two by means of a socalled church-state theory." 1 The authors further maintain that
most Christian theologians conspire to "privatize and subordinate
Christianity," especially when they assume that "Christianity consists of a set of beliefs (mere belief) that can be abstracted from
practices and actions (conduct)." ' The danger, as the authors see it,
is that Christian belief gets removed from its legitimate social context in the Church and becomes conceived as a matter of individual
freedom. The remedy that Hauerwas and Baxter propose is for
Christians to reclaim their ecclesiastical and social identity as "the
people who acknowledge the Kingship of Christ."'
One need not accept (and indeed I do not) the authors' arguments
about the value and function of church-state debates in discussions
of religious freedom to affirm that the Kingship of Christ is crucial
for the health of Christian churches. Still, I remain deeply suspicious of their claims about the social form that best serves and expresses Christian belief. Their arguments about the church's role in
society suffer from the same flight from social embodiment that they
* Assistant Professor of American Civilization and Afro-American Studies, Brown University.
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I. Stanley Hauerwas & Michael Baxter, C.S.C., The Kingship of Christ: Why Freedom of
"Belief' is Not Enough, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 107, 107 (1992).
2. Id. at I10:
3. Id.
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claim characterizes their opponents' in the church-state debate. And
the intellectual road Hauerwas and Baxter travel inductively from
their conclusion of Christ's Kingship - leading through arguments
about freedom and political practice, the insuperable conflicts introduced by church-state debates, and the relation of civil religion to
authentic Christian belief - is marked by signs of confusing detours and confounding dilemmas.
In my response to Hauerwas and Baxter's position, I will show
how their narrow focus. on secondary, less helpful issues in the history of church-state debates obscures more compelling and primary
points of concern that have a better chance of illumining these debates. Then I will show how Hauerwas and Baxter's views of religious indifferentism rest on faulty analogies between free speech and
freedom of religion, reveal an inadequate theory of politics, and are
plagued by insurmountable dilemmas. In the end, their worries
about indifferentism pale in comparison to the specter of irrelevance
posed by Hauerwas and Baxter's beliefs to the lives of everyday
Christians perplexed by the right relation between religion and
politics.
Finally, I will argue that their understanding of the Christian tradition implies a homogenous idea of faith that excludes from consideration other relevant examples of the relation between church and
society that might challenge or support their views. Among other
helpful models, the example of the prophetic black church presents
a vital vision of the relationship between faith and politics that preserves Christian identity while expanding the possibilities of democracy, an unjustifiable task for Christians from Hauerwas's point of
view,4 but a central claim of black prophetic Christianity.
I.

HAUERWAS,

BAXTER, AND A CLASSIC CASE OF LOSING SIGHT

OF THE FOREST FOR THE SAKE OF THE TREES

Hauerwas and Baxter's misgivings about the First Amendment in
their present essay derive partially from a narrow interpretation of
4. For a sampling of Hauerwas's criticism of Christian ethical defenses of democracy, see Stanley Hauerwas, A Christian Critique of Christian America. in COMMUNITY IN AMERICA: THE
CHALLENGE OF HABITS OF THE HEART 250-65 (Charles H. Reynolds & Ralph V. Norman eds.;
1988). See also STANLEY HAUERWAS, THE PEACEABLE KINGDOM: A PRIMER IN CHRISTIAN ETH-

ics 12-13, 111 (1983). For claims about prophetic black Christianity's contention that democracy
is a fundamental norm of prophetic black Christianity, see CORNEL WEST. PROPHESY DELIVERANCE!: AN AFRO-AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY CHRISTIANITY

18-19 (1982).
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church-state relations by columnist George Will. 6 As Hauerwas and
Baxter explain, for Will; the "heart of the constitutional understanding of 'religion,' " is the "distinction between 'conduct' and
'mere belief.' "0 According to the authors, Will elaborates this distinction by saying that the Founding Fathers sought to avoid the
religious controversies that plagued Europe by establishing in religion's stead the commercial republic of capitalism.' Influenced by
John Locke, who maintained that the truth of religion cannot be
established by reason, Thomas Jefferson shaped the American doctrine of the free exercise of religion, which made religions private
and subordinate to the political order. As long as religion is mere
belief and private, the logic goes, it is free and unrestricted. But
when it becomes a matter of conduct or behavior, religion is subject
to the rule of law. For Will, this represents the Founders' genius; for
Hauerwas and Baxter, it is sheer anathema, an intolerable rub.
But Will has a severely limited and self-serving view of the First
Amendment. Even if we acknowledge the distinctions many Founders made between belief and behavior, we are not automatically
bound to Will's interpretation of their views. Indeed, Hauerwas and
Baxter's worries are legitimate only if Will's argument about the
Founders' beliefs turns out to be the crucial distinction in the constitutional view of religion. But the most important distinction is not
between conduct and mere belief, but between freedom of conscience and the coercion to believe. This distinction is made clear
when we carefully consider in historical context the easily misinterpreted terms of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, the prime
architects of the constitutional concept of freedom of religion.
James Madison, who contributed key phrases to the important
Virginia Declaration of Rights, an exemplary document defending
5. I am not suggesting that Hauerwas's treatment of the First Amendment is limited to this
essay, or that the tension between church and state, and religion and politics is a new subject for
him, or one exclusively pursued in this essay. Anyone familiar with Hauerwas's work will know of
his long-standing views on such matters. See in particular Hauerwas's books: STANLEY
HAUERWAS, CHRISTIAN EXISTENCE TODAY: ESSAYS ON CHURCH, WORLD AND LIVING IN-BETWEEN (1987); STANLEY HAUERWAS, AGAINST THE NATIONS: WAR AND SURVIVAL IN A LIBERAL
SOCIETY (1985)

[hereinafter AGAINST THE NATIONS]; STANLEY HAUERWAS,

A

COMMUNITY OF

CHARACTER: TOWARD A CONSTRUCTIVE CHRISTIAN ETHIC (1981) [hereinafter A COMMUNITY OF
CHARACTER]; and HAUERWAS, supra note 4. 1 am treating, however, the specific context of

Hauerwas and Baxter's remarks as they relate to points they make about Will's interpretation of
the First Amendment.
6. Hauerwas & Baxter, supra note 1,at 108.
7. Id.
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freedom of religion, proposed the language of the First Amendment
that was eventually revised and enacted by the First Congress.' In
proposing the First Amendment, Madison was as greatly influenced
by the suffering of religious dissenters at the hands of the Church of
England as by enlightenment ideals of reason's superiority and the
doctrine of natural rights." These ideals led Madison to declare that
religion "can be directed only by reason and conviction." 10 And the
brutal battles fought over religious freedom led him to conclude that
"all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion according to the dictates of conscience.""
Such religious battles also convinced Madison that religious belief
must not be established or imposed by the state. This was especially
true for a revealed religion like Christianity, whose claims to the
exclusive possession of truth also opened the possibility of religiously
justified claims to political power. 2 To circumvent this possibility in
the embryonic nation, Christianity had to be shorn of its potential
political authority, a strategy achieved by challenging Christianity's
biblical authority and asserting its status as a reason governed discourse, a transformation that profoundly shaped Madison's views of
religion, and Jefferson's as well.' 3
Indeed, Jefferson, in the strong embrace of Lockean liberalism,
natural rights philosophy, and enlightenment rationality, also rejected Christianity's status as revelation. 4 With Madison and othersimilarly enlightened men, Jefferson declared religion a matter of
opinion. 5 This view led him to proclaim that when the neighbors of
Americans say that there are twenty gods, or no God, such a statement neither "picks one's pockets nor breaks one's legs," precisely
because it is not backed by the force of law.' For Jefferson and the
8. See Walter Berns, Religion and the Founding Principle, in THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 204, 208 (Robert H. Horwitz ed., 1986).

9. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 260
(1967); MARTIN E. MARTY, PILGRIMS IN THEIR OWN LAND: 500 YEARS OF RELIGION IN
AMERICA 162-63 (1984).
10. BAILYN, supra note 9, at 260 (quoting James Madison in the Virginia Declaration of
Rights).
11. Id. (quoting James Madison in the Virginia Declaration of Rights).
12. See Berns, supra note 8, at 220.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 219-25. For an exposition on Locke's views of Christianity, see Michael P. Zuckert,
Locke and the Problem of Civil Religion, in THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, supra note 8, at 181.
15. For Madison on religion as opinion, see MARTY, supra note 9, at 163.
16. See Hauerwas & Baxter, supra note 1, at 109 (referring to Will's discussion of Jefferson).
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Founders, such an opinion is distinguished from officially established
and recognized beliefs. Since the government is derived from the
natural rights of human beings and not divine revelation, such opinions would neither mandate punishment nor require exceptional protection for their utterance. To act otherwise, as if the religious opinion that there was no God or twenty gods could cause injury to be
inflicted upon its bearer, is to acknowledge that such an utterance
fractured a legally sanctioned belief about God. But this would be
contrary to the constitutional view of religion.
And more importantly for the fledgling nation, Christianity was
no longer to be protected from challenge or dissent under cover of
legal sanction. Thus, the interests of nonbelievers, unorthodox believers, and dissenting Christians converged around the disestablishment of religion and the establishment of religious freedom. In view
of this history, the central distinction in the constitutional view of
religion is indeed between freedom of conscience and the coercion to
believe. Hauerwas and Baxter's acceptance of Will's distinction between mere belief and conduct as the primary constitutional religious issue causes them to overlook the bitter cultural and interpretive wars fought over the freedom of religion by citizens oppressed
by the intolerant behavior of the established church. By viewing the
issue of the freedom of religion in relation to the historical events I
have just sketched, Hauerwas and Baxter might be led to accentuate the struggles of oppressed Christians and other citizens against
the power of the Church when it is officially entrenched by law in a
classic Constantinian contract with the state. 17 Ironically, the Constantinian compromise of the church is a favorite theme of
Hauerwas's ethical reflections and invites vigorous exposition in the
present context. 8 But Hauerwas and Baxter's pursuit of a less important constitutional distinction has diverted their attention from a
suitable occasion to press one of Hauerwas's more powerful charges.
Even a cursory reading of the events precipitating the develop17. As Robert Bellah defines it, Constantinianism is the danger that "Christianity will be used
instrumentally for the sake of creating political community but to the detriment of its own authenticity." Robert N. Bellah, The Idea of Practices in Habits: A Response, in COMMUNITY IN
AMERICA, supra note 4, at 269, 277. As Hauerwas understands the term (building on the work of
John Howard Yoder), which is drawn from Constantine's conversion to Christianity, it is the
*assumption that "Christians should or do have social and political power so they can determine
the ethos of society. . . .Constantine is the symbol of the decisive shift in the logic of moral
argument when Christians ceased being a minority and accepted Caesar as a member of the
church." Hauerwas, supra note 4, at 260.
18. See Hauerwas, supra note 4, at 260.
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ment of the First Amendment suggests that it was a brilliantly preemptive and bloodless resolution of religious conflict. By disestablishing religion and establishing religious freedom, the Founders
translated an a priori denial of privilege to any one religion in particular as the principle for extending privilege to them all. The crucial distinction in the constitutional view of religion is the one between enforced religious views and the freedom to practice the
religion of one's choice or community. Viewing the freedom of religion debate in this manner allows us to understand what really was
at stake for citizens who endured hardship because of their opposition to the politically protected claims of official and legal
Christianity.
But Hauerwas and Baxter's silence on this aspect of the churchstate debate is rooted perhaps in a presumption of the homogeneity
of the Christian experience, a point I will take up in greater detail
later. For now, it is enough to say that the freedom of religion debate pointed to the vibrant religious diversity, especially within
Christianity. itself, that was mocked by the rigid constraints and
narrow practices of the Church of England, and established religion
in the colonies. Established religion defined the Church in the singular; but the existence of New Light Presbyterians, Strict Congregationalists, Separate Baptists, and even Methodists demanded that it
be reconceived in the plural.' 9
Conflicts created by the quest for the tolerance of religious pluralism is an inescapably key theme that must be addressed in any credible account of the events surrounding and leading to the First
Amendment. Its avoidance is certain to lead to truncated and selfserving versions of events which shaped, in principle, the democratic
destiny of our nation. Indeed, the religious question played a crucial
role in the beginning of free government:
No question was then more important, none played so prominent a role in
the thought of the pertinent theorists - Hobbes, Locke, Spinoza, Bayle,
and, to a lesser but still significant extent, even Montesquieu - and even if
it could be said that they solved it, or answered it, in principle, it was left to
the American Founders to be the first to solve it, or to try to solve it, in
practice. 0

Of course, as Hauerwas and Baxter's discussion of Employment
19. For the pressure these groups brought to bear upon the colonies for freedom of religion, see
supra note 9, at 257-58.
20. Berns, supra note 8, at 206.

BAILYN,
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Division v. Smith 21 proves, freedom of religion has met limitations
in the form of state proscription of religious beliefs which intersect
the nebulous area between important aspects of law and faith. We
have also seen the opposite effect in the case of the Jonestown mass
suicides, where the failure of state intervention in the name of freedom of religion perhaps inadvertently aided the economic and religious exploitation and deaths of over nine hundred persons.22 But
uses of freedom of religion have largely safeguarded the religious
liberties of faith communities to pursue the practice of their beliefs
in a society where religious prejudice, bigotry, and intolerance were
denied legal underpinning.
The glaring exception, of course, is chattel slaves, who were for
most of their enslavement legally barred from free worship without
white supervision. But even black Christians came to cherish the
First Amendment because it protected their hard won freedom to
worship without governance, while also giving legal expression to
their concern that other groups not suffer similar penalties of social
and religious intolerance. The formulation of the First Amendment
by the Founders presented a tenable solution to the religious suffering created by the legalization of Christianity. It may be cogently
argued that with the First Amendment a large and vital Christian
21. 485 U.S 660 (1990).
22. Interestingly, Hauerwas raises the possibility of challenging the ideals that underlay the
Jonestown community, but only through intellectual or religious debate or criticism of the community; even in light of the atrocities committed there, he does not entertain the possibility of state
intervention, or active Christian intervention, to protect the exploited victims of Jim Jones's practices. He says:
Our tragedy is that there was no one internal or external to that community able to
challenge the false presuppositions of Jones's false ideals. Our continuing tragedy is
that our reactions to and our interpretations of the deaths of Jonestown reveal accurately how we lack the convictions to counter the powers that reigned there.
STANLEY HAUERWAS, On Taking Religion Seriously: The Challenge of Jonestown, in AGAINST
THE NATIONS, supra note 5, at 91, 103.
On the other hand, John Bennett sees Jonestown as an indication that freedom of religion is not
absolute, and as an example of the difficulty of determining when and if state intervention into
religious practices should occur. Unlike Hauerwas, however, he concedes the possibility that state
intervention is a plausible course of action under admittedly difficult to define circumstances. Bennett says:
That . . . religious freedom from any limitation by the state is not absolute is well
illustrated by the terrible events in Jonestown. After those events it is easy to see
there should have been protection of people against such exploitation and even lethal
abuse by a religious leader, but it is not easy to say exactly at what point and by what
method the state should have entered -the picture.
John C. Bennett, Church and State in the United States, in REFORMED FAITH AND POLITICS 121,
122 (Ronald H. Stone ed., 1983).
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purpose was served, that the ideals of Christian love and tolerance
were ironically promoted through the government's refusal to cede
Christianity official status. By keeping believers from maiming one
another over religious disputes, the government instituted in law
what Christian belief aimed for in principle but generally failed to
achieve in practice. It would not be the last time the government
intervened in the face of the failure of Christians to act on their
beliefs, a topic about which I shall have more to say later.
Overall the First Amendment has been very good for Christianity.
It forced Christian churches to appeal to potential adherents on the
basis of persuasive preaching, sound theology, superior ways of life,
and sacrificial action.2" Once they were cut from the strings of official obligation, independent Christian churches were free to prophetically address the state and to criticize practices that were offensive to moral principles to which churches strongly adhered. The
benefits of the separation of church and state are nicely summarized
by John Bennett, who says that it fulfills both the "need of religious
institutions to be free from control by the state," and the "need to
protect citizens from interference with their religious liberty" by either state power or religious groups, and that it "is favorable to the
24
health and vitality of churches.1

In Hauerwas and Baxter's essay, the alarm set off by Will's insistence that the free exercise of religion rests on religion's privatization and subordination is largely unnecessary. Perhaps we can reach
a clearer understanding if we examine the two terms of Will's contention separately. To proclaim that religion will not carry the
weight of law by being disestablished is not the same as saying religion will be made private.25 It is very important not to collapse the
two as Will has done, a move Hauerwas and Baxter fail to challenge. Indeed, many of the Founders promoted the advantage of the
public expression of religion even as they asserted the necessity for
religion's disestablishment.
23. To understand how this view among the Founders is characterized, see Martin Marty's
summary of Benjamin Franklin's views on established religion in MARTY, supra note 9, at 158.
He states, "Yet [Franklin] attacked churchly establishment: when a religion was good, it would
support itself. If a religion could not support itself and God did not care to come to its aid, it was
a bad sign if then the members had to call on government for help." Id.
24. Bennett, supra note 22, at 121-22.
25. It must be admitted that religion under the First Amendment becomes a matter of private
choice versus public coercion, but that meaning of privacy is not in question here. Rather, it is
whether religion under the First Amendment is rendered necessarily and exclusively private without the possibility of its public expression.
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Because the Founders were not orthodox Christians, the views
they held about the role of religion in the Republic had more to do
with its preservative function in national life and its support of political institutions than its strictly redemptive role as envisioned by
partisan believers.2 Benjamin Franklin, for instance, saw the virtue
of what he called "public religion," the forerunner of what we know
today as civil religion. 7 Martin Marty says that by public religion:
[Franklin] meant not the end of sects but of sectarianism, not the end of
their freedoms but the increase of their duty to produce a common morality.
Wherever he saw churches agreeing, he encouraged their support of the
common weal, and he opposed their spats over their peculiarities. His faith
. . . was in . . . the need to do good .... 29

Franklin's views resonated with other Founders, who sought to fashion a public polity based on the premise that a common moral community underlay the Republic. As Marty says:
Fortunately for later America, the Founding Fathers, following the example
of Franklin, put their public religion to good use. While church leaders usually forayed only briefly into the public arena and then scurried back to
mind their own shops, men of the Enlightenment worked to form a social
fabric that assured freedom to tle several churches, yet stressed common
29
concerns of society.

George Washington also subscribed to a belief in the public utility of religion, asserting the link between religion and public morality as the foundation of national flourishing. In his Farewell Address, Washington stated:
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion
and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the
tribute of patriotism who should labor to subvert these great pillars of
human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of men and citizens. The
mere politician, equally with the pious man, ought to respect and to cherish
them. . . . Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education
on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle."
26. Of course, Hauerwas and Baxter might argue that the Founders viewed religion primarily
as an aid, and not a critic, of the government. That may be the case, but as they point out in
regard to the freedom of religion in their discussion of Will earlier in their essay, the intent of the
Founders is not as important as what has occurred in practice., Similarly, what has occurred in
practice is that persons and groups have appealed to their religious beliefs to challenge American
government, ranging from the civil rights movement to antinuclear activists.
27. MARTY, supra note 9, at 155-56.
28. Id. at 157.

29. Id. at 158.
30. Berns, supra note 8, at 213 (quoting George Washington's Farewell Address).
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And even Thomas Jefferson, despite his unorthodox Christian beliefs and his individualization of religious faith, demonstrated appreciation for religion's public function in the Republic, especially since
the proliferation of religious bodies would serve as a built-in check
and balance to American religious life. According to Jefferson, the
function of "several sects perform the office of a Censor morum over
each other." 3' He also valued religion for lending moral support to
political liberty when he queried: "And can the liberties of a nation
be thought secure when we have removed their only firm basis, a
conviction in the minds of the people that these liberties are the gift
of God?" 2
Of course, it is exactly the public expression of religion' along
these lines that disturbs Hauerwas and Baxter, who hold that national or civil religion is "counterfeit" Christianity uprooted from an
account of the good. Even if one maintains this view, however, it
does not negate the fact that there is nothing in the First Amendment that prohibits the public expression of religion, including
Christianity, in the Republic. Thus, as Hauerwas and Baxter present his case, Charles Taylor's arguments about religion and political life are on target: there was neither intent nor need in the separation of church and state to exclude God or religion from the
Republic.
Similarly, the subordination of religion to the political order is not
as bad as Hauerwas and Baxter deem it to be, because it does not
mean what they fear it to imply. I have already hinted at my response earlier by suggesting that one virtue of the separation of
church and state is Christianity's enhanced potential to address the
state on politically independent terms. But Will's claim is also legitimate that religion was to be made subordinate to the political order.
The tension that arises from these apparently contradictory claims
can be relieved by examining the two ways in which we can read
religious subordination: either functionally or morally.
First, since American society was deliberately constructed upon
secular principles to avoid the fatal conflicts occasioned by established religion in the England of the Founders' recent memory, the
subordination of religion to the state went hand in hand with the
creation of the nation and the establishment of the freedom of reli31. Id. at 217-18 (quoting Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, in 4 THE
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 80 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1904-05)).

32. Id. at 213 (quoting Thomas Jefferson's discussion of slavery).

WORKS
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gion. Saying that religion is subordinate to the political order is the
positive statement of its more generally repeated negative formulation: that religion will not be established, or politically justified, in
American society. What is meant is that religion will not function
officially to adjudicate national disputes, will not occupy legal status
to enforce civil codes, and will not be the means by which social
goods are distributed. These functions are left to the political realm.
Hence, in a legal sense, religion is functionally subordinate to
politics.
On the other hand, if by subordinate it is meant that religion will
surrender its independence to the political order to merely justify, or
even sanctify, its practices; that religion will abdicate its role as
critic of governmental and state practices; that religion will no
longer provide moral visions and ethical principles by which advocates of justice may call society to judgment, then religion is without question morally insubordinate to and politically independent
of the political realm. Its functional subordination by no means entails its moral subordination.
The difference is that functional subordination is the very premise
by which American religions can claim their freedom to express
faith and exercise their belief, especially in the social and public
sphere. But moral insubordination is the way religions preserve their
integrity and viability, and perform their real worth to the Republic
by calling it to judgment in relation to their specific moral visions.
Moreover, as I will more fully argue later, if the moral visions of
religion are to have public persuasion, they must be cast in terms
that transcend narrow or sectarian religious language and concern,
demonstrating their relevance by their prophetic judgment of, or application to, the nation in compelling public terms."'
Given these distinctions, Hauerwas and Baxter's worries that religion becomes private and subordinate to the state in the First
Amendment are dissolved when we bring more precision to our understanding of the terms of religion's relation to the state. If
33. Admittedly this distinction between functional and moral subordination does not completely
resolve the tensions created by conflicts of conscience over legally established political practices. In
such cases, of course, it is clear that moral insubordination takes precedence; but the violation of
the law in the name of conscience results in the Christian acknowledging the conflict created by
her religious beliefs by accepting the penalty of breaking the law until the law is changed, either
as a result of civil disobedience or through shifted public consensus, or reconstructed public practice, later reflected in law. The examples of Christian participation in the civil rights movement,
feminist movements, and antinuclear war movements stand out.
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Hauerwas and Baxter's real concern is to resist the privatization and
moral subordination of Christianity, their fight is not with constitutional views of religion, but with forms of Christian experience and
belief which claim that the church's most perfect social expression is
limited to ecclesial expressions, as Hauerwas and Baxter proclaim.
Ironically, then, it is Hauerwas and Baxter who turn out to be the
real opponents of the full social embodiment of Christianity. By refusing to acknowledge the legitimate expression of Christian faith
outside the perimeters of the church, Hauerwas and Baxter contribute to a fatal narrowing of religious belief, a position that has led to
34
Hauerwas being characterized (fairly I think) as a sectarian.
Their sectarian belief conflicts with their intent to resist the privatization, and indirectly, the subordination of Christianity. Their
views also lead them to de-emphasize the crucial features of the
34. For instance, Ronald Thiemann has argued that Hauerwas represents one of two unacceptable options in developing an effective public Christian response to the crises of North American
civilization. Thiemann summarizes the thinking of theologian Paul Lehmann:
Arguing out of the Reformed tradition's close association of faith with obedience,
Lehmann asserts that proper worship always has as its goal the accomplishment of
justice in the world. The righteousness of faith must result in transformative justice
within the public realm. Thus Christian worship is essentially political, and the
lietourgia of the church extends naturally and directly into political action.
RONALD F. THIEMANN, CONSTRUCTING A PUBLIC THEOLOGY: THE CHURCH IN A PLURALISTIC
CULTURE 114 (1991).
The second option is represented by Hauerwas in his book, A COMMUNITY OF CHARACTER,
supra note 5. Thiemann characterizes this position, saying:
By being faithful to the narratives that shape Christian character, the church will
witness to a way of life that stands apart from and in criticism of our liberal secular
culture. Christian worship, then, must be an end in itself directed solely toward the
cultivation of those peculiar theological virtues that mark the church as a distinctive
community.
THEIMANN, supra, at 114.
But Thiemann concludes that neither of these options "provides us with the theological resources we need to face the distinctive challenge presented to North American Christians," Id. He
continues: "Neither the politicization of worship nor its sectarian separation from public life will
suffice in our current situation. . . . We must find a middle way between the reduction of the
Christian gospel to a program of political action and the isolation of that gospel from all political
engagement." Id. Further, David Hollenbach juxtaposes their belief that "the church has a responsibility to help shape the life of society as a whole," to Hauerwas's position on such matters.
David Hollenbach, S.i., Justice as Participation:Public Moral Discourse and the U.S. Economy,
in COMMUNITY IN AMERICA. supra note 4, at 217, 220. Hollenbach says:
Hauerwas concludes that the church should cease and desist from the attempt to articulate universal moral norms persuasive to all members of a pluralistic society. ...
[The letter's] disagreement with Hauerwas is with his exclusive concern with the
quality of the witness of the Christian community's own life. In the traditional categories of Ernest Troeltsch, the bishops refuse to take the 'sectarian' option of exclusive
reliance on the witness of the Christian community that Hauerwas recommends.
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church-state debate that have the best chance to illumine the historical conflicts over religious tolerance, plurality, difference, and diversity, issues that also clearly affect our contemporary religious and
cultural scene. More importantly, their position also reduces the potential impact of the gospel on the lives of Christians struggling to
understand the proper role of faith in contemporary political
debates.
II.

How

OUR HEROES' FAULTY ANALOGIES LEAD TO FAULTY
CONCLUSIONS

Hauerwas and Baxter's deficiencies are further magnified in the
way they make analogies between freedom of speech and freedom of
religion in pressing their case. Drawing on an essay by Stanley Fish,
the authors claim that just as freedom of speech has paved the way
for "indifferentism" in speech, so freedom of religion has led to "religious indifferentism." According to Hauerwas and Baxter, Fish
claims that speech has become a matter of indifference because it
has been severed from an account of the good that assigns value to
"free speech," which in reality has built-in limits against those expressions its exponents deem harmful to its flourishing. 5
On this view, freedom of speech is really an illusion. Plus, all the
distinctions that Will made about religion find analogous expression
in "a private sphere not only of speech and ideas, but also . . . of
'mere speech' and 'mere ideas,' of speech and ideas understood
apart from any substantive account of the good which they serve." 36
The same holds for religion. As Hauerwas and Baxter say,
"[i]nherent in Christian convictions is a substantive account of the
good," an account which is in tension with "all so-called political
accounts of the good." 37 Moreover, when political accounts of the
good underwrite a vision of God and Christianity that is rooted in
civil religion, there is conflict with genuine Christianity. Hauerwas
and Baxter state that when Christianity gets separated from its embodied social form, Christian belief becomes "asocial" and degenerates into mere belief, while a "counterfeit" religion, a religion of the
nation, rises to take Christianity's place. 8
On the face of it - judging from the passages they cite 35.
36.
37.
38.

Hauerwas & Baxter, supra note 1, at 111-15.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 119-20.
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Hauerwas and Baxter's use of Fish's work appears consonant with
their project, an act of untroubled appropriation. But a closer reading of Fish's essay suggests that there are irresolvable tensions between his views and Hauerwas and Baxter's, tensions which have to
do primarily with theological presumptions in Fish's work that are
diametrically opposed to Hauerwas and Baxter's beliefs. Such tensions place Hauerwas and Baxter in a confounding dilemma. As a
result, for Hauerwas and Baxter to successfully adopt Fish's arguments, they will either have to substantially alter their positions, or
give up their present beliefs about the appropriate social expression
of Christian faith.
The tensions between Fish's analysis and Hauerwas and Baxter's
use of it are glimpsed in Fish's discussion of the possible objections
to his view of free speech as articulated by its defenders. What the
defenders of free speech could say, Fish hypothesizes, is that he has
not appropriately anticipated future revisions to his specific account
of the good for which speech stands, thus prematurely closing possible valid interpretations to future generations. Specifically, Fish
stated:
My mistake, it could be said, is to equate the something in whose service
speech is with some locally espoused value (e.g., the end of racism, the empowerment of disadvantaged minorities), whereas in fact we should think of
that something as a now inchoate shape . . . . [W]e cannot now know it,
and therefore we must not prematurely fix it in ways that will bind successive generations to error., 9

But Fish demurs from this position on the First Amendment, saying
that it "continues in a secular form the Puritan celebration of millenarian hopes, but it imposes a requirement so severe that one would
expect more justification than is usually provided." 0 Fish continues:
The requirement is that we endure whatever pain racist and hate speech
inflicts for the sake of a future whose emergence we can only take on faith.
In a specifically religious vision like Milton's, this makes perfect sense (it is
indeed the whole of Christianity), but in the context of a politics that puts
its trust in the world and not in the Holy Spirit, it raises more questions
than it answers .... 41

For Fish, this alternative to his view makes "perfect sense" only if
39. Stanley Fish, There's No Such Thing As Free Speech And It's A Good Thing, Too, in
P.C.: THE CONTROVERSY OVER POLITICAL CORRECTNESS ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES 231,
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40. Id.
41. Id. at 241-42.
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it is rooted in a Christian interpretation of events that he implies
does not prevail in our culture, or at least not in the political realms
where decisions about the First Amendment are debated and resolved. Such a Christian interpretation of events, which would counsel enduring the present penalties imposed by free speech, could
only be supported by belief in a future guaranteed by religious faith.
Moreover, such a Christian perspective is only coherent within a political framework that puts its trust in the Holy Spirit. Thus, the key
features of this opposing view to Fish's position are dependent upon
the premises of a religious worldview to make its claims cogent.
Also, such a religious perspective would influence the political expression of the alternative to Fish's position, and could therefore in
no way be identical to his views of free speech, or by extension, free
religion. As Fish has already indicated, one such crucial difference
between his position and its alternative might be that free speech in
the abstract must be protected, even though it means the present
and concrete suffering by blacks and minorities, because of a future
disclosure of truth which in retrospect will alter how we perceive
present suffering. The good to be revealed in the future guaranteed
by faith, we can infer, will compensate for, or at least justify, the
present suffering.
The point is that Fish's view is predicated upon an explicitly secular view that would seem to severely contradict Hauerwas and Baxter's views. The sorts of evidence that count in the realm of faith
will not do for the secular realm - the requirement, as Fish says, is
too severe. The opposite is also true, that the sorts of evidence sufficient in the secular realm will not wash in the realm of faith. The
severe requirement that Fish cannot imagine bearing derives from
its linkage to a Christian world view where evidence is supplied by
faith and trust in the Holy Spirit. This latter alternative - which
Fish says requires that we acknowledge "the (often grievous) consequences but declare that we must suffer them in the name of something that cannot be named" 42 - is the second of two unacceptable
alternatives (and the one not mentioned by Hauerwas and Baxter)
to his position. The first is the alternative Hauerwas and Baxter do
mention, the position that makes speech inconsequential and a matter of indifference.
This second alternative to Fish's position seems ideally suited for
42. Id. at 242.
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Hauerwas and Baxter, and given their religious outlook - which
emphasizes the social expression of Christianity in the church and
opposition to secular liberal society as the " 'politics that know not
God' " - the one that they would logically adopt.43 The only problem is that by adopting such a view, Hauerwas and Baxter immediately face a dilemma. In accepting the religious basis of society signified by trust in the Holy Spirit and the Kingship of Christ, they
are identified with a position that Fish claims is opposed to the sort
of secular logic that clinches the case that he makes for speech inconsequentialism, and that Hauerwas and Baxter by analogy extend
to religious indifferentism. On the other hand, if Hauerwas and
Baxter reject the secular logic of Fish's position, they have destroyed the basis of their argument for the indifferentism of freedom
of religion, and would have to forfeit their claim that it has corrupted the church-state debate because it is rooted in the sort of
reasoning they find offensive to Christian belief. Either way,
Hauer.was and Baxter are caught in a damning dilemma.
There is yet another point of tension between Hauerwas and Baxter, and Fish. Fish contends that both alternatives to his views - of
speech as inconsequential and present suffering for the sake of a
nameless something - are unpersuasive. But he admits that "many
in the society seemed to have bought them.""' Why? Because:
They do not wish to face what they take to be the alternative. That alternative is politics, the realization (at which I have already hinted) that decisions about what is and is not protected in the realm of expression will rest
not on principle or firm doctrine but on the ability of persons and groups to
so operate (some would say manipulate) the political process that the speech
they support is labelled "protected" while the speech inimical to their interests is declared to be fair game.' 5

To those who respond that politics would render the First Amendment a "dead letter," or that it deprives us of norms in determining
"when and what speech to protect," or that it effaces the distinction
between speech and action, Fish argues for the primacy of politics."'
Fish responds:
[T]he First Amendment has always been a dead letter if one understood its
"liveness" to depend on the identification and protection of a realm of
"mere" expression or discussion distinct from the realm of regulatable con43. THIEMANN, supra note 34, at 24 (quoted language attributed to Hauerwas).
44. Fish, supra note 39, at 242.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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duct; that the distinction between speech and action has always been effaced
in principle, although in practice it can take whatever form the prevailing
political conditions mandate; that we have never had any normative guidance for marking off protected from unprotected speech; rather, that the
guidance we have has been fashioned (and refashioned)
in the very political
4
struggles over which it then (for a time) presides. 7

In sum, for Fish the "name of the game has always been politics,
even when (indeed, especially when) it is played by stigmatizing
'
politics as the area to be avoided." 48
As if Hauerwas and Baxter's arguments were not already on the
ropes because of their earlier dilemma, this last argument of Fish's
deals a fatal blow to their aspirations to make Christianity social
but not political, especially because so much of their argument
hinges on the effective correlation between Fish's views on free
speech and the conclusions Hauerwas and Baxter draw from them
about the perils of free religion. Fish explicitly endorses politics as
the means by which claims of free speech are made intelligible and
cogent, precisely because politics has been the implicit basis of understanding and applying .the Amendment from the very beginning.
The same, presumably, should hold for the application of politics to
free religion claims. But Hauerwas and Baxter are unwilling to cede
the primacy of politics in making the claims of Christianity cogent,
or of adjudicating religious conflict, which is the obvious application
of Fish's position to their own. Again, they are faced with a dilemma: if they give up politics, they give up the punch line to Fish's
arguments, severely compromising the force of his contentions, and
by extension, their arguments. But if they adopt politics, they abort
their arguments about the primacy of a confessional God and ecclesial religion to politics. Either way, a principle they cherish is
surrendered.
In some places in their essay, it appears that Hauerwas and Baxter will stick with Fish all the way through. They say that with "the
indifferentism which inevitably ensues when speech is considered
apart from the good, 'freedom of speech' enjoys protection in the
United States according to arbitrary patterns of political influence
and power as much as according to any consistent application of
constitutional principles."49 It seems as though they are on the verge
47. Id. at 243.
48. Id.
49. Hauerwas & Baxter, supra note 1, at 115.
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of acknowledging that value-laden, good, dependent notions of free
speech, and by analogy free religion, need to be negotiated by politics, which in this case amounts to the struggle to assign value to
goods defined in the abstract.
But Hauerwas and Baxter dismiss such hopes by saying that only
"within [the] ecclesial context, that is, only within a context in
which the social landscape is imbued with the presence of Christ,
can Christianity emerge as an alternative both to liberal freedom
and civic freedom and, more generally, to the political project we
call the United States of America." 50 For Hauerwas and Baxter, the
task is to "provide an alternative vision to the political vision of
America, one that is shaped by the acknowledgment that true political authority is to be found not in any republican virtues, new or
ancient, nor in any set of governmental procedures, but in Jesus
Christ who is our true King."51 So much for politics!
111.

POLITICS AND CHRISTIANITY WORKING TOGETHER: A GOOD
EXAMPLE AND A BAD EXAMPLE (YES, CONTRARY TO OUR
HEROES' BELIEFS, EXAMPLES EXIST)

By refusing to enter the fray, to give political justification and
arguments for their beliefs about the Christian good, Hauerwas and
Baxter not only repudiate their connection with the sort of social
activity that Fish describes as necessary for those who refute nebulous concepts of the freedom of speech, but they also risk a more
serious setback with disturbing consequences for the Christian
church: they fail to offer to everyday Christians stuck in the gritty
interstices of politics adequate resources and substantive recommendations for moving beyond paralysis, confusion, or wrong practice.
Just when Christians caught in the punishing political dilemmas of
contemporary society need a note of reveille, retreat is sounded.
Thus, the most harmful effect of Hauerwas and Baxter's views of
free speech and free religion may not be the indifferentism they
worry over, but the sheer irrelevance of their views to the church to
which they are committed.
This irrelevance is pegged on the peculiar social but apolitical vision Hauerwas and Baxter have of Christian faith. By failing to
take politics seriously, they can do little more than lament, for in50. Id. at 120.
51. Id.
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stance, the loss of rights by Smith in the Supreme Court case they
cite.5 1 At best, they can make intellectual moves to reject the distinctions that have made religion a matter of indifference. Because
they refuse to engage a public beyond the church, Hauerwas and
Baxter have little chance to affect the manner in which discussion is
formed around these issues in the public sphere. More poignantly,
Hauerwas and Baxter's modus operandi cannot affect future legal
and political decisions that similarly impact other citizens' lives and
their freedom of religious beliefs.
Hauerwas and Baxter's problems are also rooted in yet a third
dimension of their discussion of religious indifferentism that they
themselves seem not to take seriously: a substantive account of the
good that is the background to their notion of Christian faith. Not
only should speech have an account of the good, as Hauerwas and
Baxter contend, but by extension of their analogy between free
speech and free religion, so should Christian faith. The point here is
not to highlight an account of the Good to which Christian faith can
be said to generally refer - Christian love, peace, or justice, for
instance - but to elaborate the specific cultural contexts and social
visions which have decisively shaped and made specific faith communities possible. I suspect this is not high on Hauerwas and Baxter's agenda because their procedures and assumptions imply a homogeneity about the Christian faith that masks the social roots and
cultural contexts of the ecclesial embodiment of religious belief.
A.

The Good Example

Hauerwas and Baxter's approach mutes the radical diversity and
complex pluralism within the Christian faith, a situation that long
ago made it untenable in ceritain sociological and theological senses
to speak primarily of the Church. 53 Because of their procedures,
Hauerwas and Baxter have failed to take into consideration, or even
argue against, an expression of Christian faith that has creatively
confronted many of the problems discussed by the authors: the black
church. 54 By turning now to this example, I intend to illumine the
52. Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988).
53. This is not to deny universal dimensions of Christian faith. It is to challenge essentialist
notions of Christian identity fostered by references to church without spelling out the church's
social location, who its members are, under what conditions they practice their belief, what histor-

ical factors have shaped their faith, and so on.
54. 1 understand "black church" as shorthand to symbolize the views of black Christianity. The
black church is certainly not homogenous, and I shall be focusing on the prophetic dimensions of
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relation between religion and politics in one of the most helpful but
neglected models available.
Black Christian churches have had quite a different approach to
the First Amendment than the position argued by Hauerwas or
Baxter, largely because of the prominence of legal issues in determining the status, fate, and humanity of African-Americans for
much of our history. And with the central importance of religion to
African-American culture, the strong and vital connections between
civil and religious concerns have been well established. Not only has
religion helped sustain black survival in times of racial and national
crisis, but it has furnished principles and persons to justify black
claims to equal humanity and social justice in government, church,
and school. 55
Although it is by now common to cite the black Christian experience in debates about the relationship between religion and politics,
the black church is rarely viewed as a genuine source of information
about these matters in ways that count. As Cornel West has stated:
Ironically, the black church experience is often invoked as an example of the
religion/politics fusion, but rarely as a source to listen to or learn from.
Instead, it is simply viewed as an instance that confirms the particular
claims put forward by the respective sides. The black experience may no

black religious faith. Hauerwas and Baxter's failure to take the black church seriously is part of a
larger pattern that has rendered the black church invisible for most of its history. Even investigations of American religion have usually, until quite recently, excluded black religion as a central
force in American life. See, e.g., C. ERIC LINCOLN, RELIGION AND THE CONTINUING AMERICAN
DILEMMA 123 (1984) ("[T]he religious situation is structured in such a way that any investigation
of religion in America has usually meant the religion of white Americans, unless 'Negro,' 'folk,' or
'black' religion was specifically mentioned."). See also the comments of-Charles Long who said:
In short, a great many of the writings and discussions on the topic of American religion have been consciously or unconsciously ideological, serving to enhance, justify,
and render sacred the history of European immigrants in this land.
Indeed, this approach to American religion has rendered the religious reality of
non-Europeans to a state of invisibility, and thus the invisibility of the non-European
in America arises as a fundamental issue of American history at this juncture.
CHARLES H. LONG, SIGNIFICATIONS: SIGNS, SYMBOLS, AND IMAGES IN THE INTERPRETATION

OF

RELIGION 149 (1986).
55. 1 have in mind here the large number of black ministers among current members of Congress, continuing a tradition in this century established by leaders such as Adam Clayton Powell;
the activity of black church leaders in the civil rights movement and the political movements it
gave rise to, especially the presidential campaigns of Jesse Jackson; and the large number of black
churchpersons affiliated with historically black institutions of higher education. In each area, the
black church has supplied many of these persons the principles they have appealed to in making
the claims of black equality, justice, and freedom to the larger American public. See, e.g.,
CHARLES V. HAMILTON, ADAM CLAYTON POWELL, JR.: THE POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF AN AMERI-

(1991);
AMERICA (1988).

CAN DILEMMA

ROGER D. HATCH, BEYOND OPPORTUNITY: JESSE JACKSON'S VISION FOR
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longer be invisible, but it remains unheard - not allowed to speak for itself,
to be taken seriously as having something valuable to say. 56

The black church view of the relationship between religion and
politics has roots in the denominational affiliations that shaped it,
the ongoing experiences of oppression in national life that black religion ceaselessly addresses, and broad experiments in American civil
religion.
Black Christians are overwhelmingly Baptist and Methodist, a
legacy that extends back to slave culture.57 Because it was illegal to
baptize and preach to slaves during much of slavery, the process of
exposing slaves to Christianity was gradual. As slaves were eventually incorporated into Christianity on limited terms in the mideighteenth century, they were deeply affected by Methodists, and
especially Separate Baptists. The Separate Baptists were viewed
with suspicion by both the established church and society at large
during their initial stages of growth in the mid-to-late eighteenth
century."8 Deeply disinherited, poor, without formal training, and
broadly suspicious of external authority, the Separate Baptists naturally appealed to slaves who were even more ostracized from American culture than the Baptists because of their legal status as personal property.
But as they grew, Separate Baptists continued to exhibit two
traits that marked their early years: their opposition to slavery and
their enthusiastic leadership of the fight against established religion." Thus, at the base of the denomination to which slaves were
overwhelmingly drawn, and in which they eventually established independent churches in the mid-nineteenth century, was an emphasis
on the strong relation between political and civil issues and personal
and corimunal religious belief. The arguments that radical religious
dissenters made for freedom from slavery and freedom of religion
prefigured the legal and social arguments advanced by black intellectuals, organizers, and leaders in the fight against institutional racism in two important ways. 0
56.

CORNEL WEST, PROPHETIC FRAGMENTS

22-23 (1988).

57. See MECHAL SOBEL, TRABELIN' ON: THE SLAVE JOURNEY TO AN AFRO-BAPTIST FAITH
(1988); JAMES M. WASHINGTON, FRUSTRATED FELLOWSHIP: THE BLACK BAPTIST QUEST FOR SOCIAL POWER (1986).

58. SOBEL, supra note 57, at 85.
59. Id. See also BAILYN, supra note 9, at 261-62.
60. I do not mean by any measure to romanticize the religious dissenters. Although they fought
for antislavery, they fought more effectively, desperately, and consistently for their own religious

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:129

First, the religious dissenters' arguments expressed religious
themes of social justice linked to belief in God. The arguments of
Isaac Backus and John Allen against slavery and religious intolerance pictured these injustices as offenses not only to civil society,
but also to authentic Christian belief.6 ' Secondly, although their arguments were unquestionably motivated by religious concern, dissenters cast their arguments in the language of civic piety and civil
responsibility in making moral claims on the state to act justly.
These two narrative strategies were adopted and ingeniously expanded by black Christians, especially the prophetic wing of the
black church. This vital branch of black Christianity has relentlessly
explained and justified the moral and religious claims of black
Christian belief in the language of civic piety, whose vocabulary includes legal redress, moral suasion, civil rights, and political
proclamation.
This last point reveals as well African-Americans' participation in
and expansion of traditions of American civil religion. Although for
Hauerwas and Baxter it is "counterfeit" religion,62 a progressive,
largely liberal version of civil religion is critically celebrated within
African-American prophetic Christianity."3 As Charles Long says,
freedom, largely out of self-interest.
61. For instance, John Allen pointed out the hypocrisy of his fellow countrymen making claims
to colonial freedom while simultaneously denying liberty to slaves, employing religious terms like
"sacred," "praying," and "fasting" to drive home his point. He says:
Blush ye pretended votaries for freedom! ye trifling patriots! who are making a vain
parade of being advocates for the liberties of mankind, who are thus making a mockery of your profession by trampling on the sacred natural rights and privilege of Africans; for while you are fasting, praying, nonimporting, nonexporting, remonstrating,
resolving, and pleading for a restoration of your charter rights, you at the same time
are continuing this lawless, cruel, inhuman, and abominable practice of enslaving your
fellow creatures ....
BAILYN, supra note 9, at 240 (quoting John Allen, The Watchman's Alarm).
Isaac Backus pressed arguments for the religious dissenters to be released from the bondage of
the Church of England, asserting that civil and religious liberty were one. Backus tirelessly proclaimed that the church of Massachusetts " 'has declared the Baptists to be irregular, therefore
the secular power still force them to support the worship which they conscientiously dissent
from,'" and that "'many who are filling the nation with the cry of LIBERTY and against oppressors are at the same time themselves violating that dearest of all rights, LIBERTY of CONSCIENCE.'" Id. at 263 (quoting ISAAC BACKUS, A SEASONABLE PLEA FOR LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE, AGAINST SOME LATE OPPRESSIVE PROCEEDINGS 8 (Boston, 1770)).
62. Hauerwas & Baxter, supra note 1, at 120.
63. Robert Wuthnow makes helpful distinctions between conservative and liberal versions of
civil religion in ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE RESTRUCTURING OF AMERICAN RELIGION: SOCIETY AND
FAITH SINCE WORLD WAR II (1988). About conservative civil religion, Wuthnow says:
On the conservative side, America's legitimacy seems to depend heavily on a distinct
"myth of origin" that relates the nation's founding to divine purposes. According to
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"[T]he distinction between civil religion and church religion is not
one that looms large for us."6 ' He continues:
In the first place, it is the overwhelming reality of the white presence in any
of its various forms that becomes the crucial issue. Whether this presence
was legitimated by power executed illegally, or whether in institution or custom, its reality, as far as blacks were concerned through most of their history, carried the force of legal sanction enforced by power. The black response to this cultural reality is part of the civil rights struggle in the history
of American blacks. 6

Long further argues that it is not incidental that black churches
have been the locus of civil rights struggle because it "represented
the black confrontation with an American myth that dehumanized
the black person's being." 66 Furthermore, the "location of this
struggle in the church enabled the civil rights movement to take on
the resources of black cultural life," such as organization, music,
artistic expression, and in collecting limited economic resources6.7
this interpretation of American history, the American form of government enjoys lasting legitimacy because it was created by Founding Fathers who were deeply influenced by Judeo-Christian values.
Id. at 244-45.
Wuthnow also states that conservative civil religion "generally grants America a special place
in the divine order," and that the idea of "evangelizing the world is in fact a much-emphasized
theme in conservative civil religion." Id. at 247. He contends that despite "formal separation

between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of man, the 'two kingdoms' doctrine in'
conservative
civil religion also confers a strong degree of divine authority on the existing mode of government."
Id. at 248. Conservative civil religion also grants "capitalism a high degree of legitimacy by drawing certain parallels between capitalist economic principles and biblical teachings." Id.
Liberal civil religion, however, makes little "reference to the religious views of the Founding
Fathers" and does not "suggest that America is God's chosen nation." Id. at 250. Liberal civil
religion "focuses less on the nation as such, and more on humanity in general." Id. Wuthnow says
that rather than "drawing specific attention to the distinctiveness of the Judeo-Christian tradition,
liberal civil religion is much more likely to include arguments about basic human rights and common human problems." Id. Liberal civil religionists also "appeal to broader values that transcend
American culture and, indeed, challenge some of the more nationalistic assumptions it incorporates." Id. at 253. The liberal "version of American civil religion taps into a relatively deep reservoir of sentiment in the popular culture about the desirability of peace and justice." Id. As a
result, Wuthnow mentions, "religious leaders who champion these causes may detract from the
legitimacy of the current U.S. system rather than contribute to it." Id. at 254.
It would be good for Hauerwas and Baxter to keep the distinctions between the two versions of
civil religion in mind when making claims about its "counterfeit" religious status. Though it probably would not persuade them to change their views, it would nonetheless help them make crucial
distinctions about the varying functions of civil religion as it is employed and exercised by different spheres of the citizenry, and even different branches of Christianity.
64. LONG, supra note 54, at 152.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 152-53.
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In appropriating and improvising upon a vocabulary of civic piety,
black Christians have appealed to the sacred symbols of national life
and its democratic principles which find literate expression in the
Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. Perhaps the most
famous example of this long-standing black church tradition is symbolized in Martin Luther King, Jr.'s brilliant career. Like his Separate Baptist predecessors and his black Baptist ancestors, King employed the language of civic piety (particularly civil rights) in
articulating at once the goals of African-American religion and a
version of liberal democracy.68 Although he remained rooted in his
religious base, King transcended the narrow focus of sectarian and
myopic religious concerns to embrace a universal moral perspective
in addressing, first, the specific suffering of black Americans, and
eventually, the economic exploitation and racial oppression of other
"minorities."
But King's genius lay in his ability to show how increased democracy for African-Americans served the common good by making democracy hew closer to its ideals than its performance in the distant
and recent past suggested. King spoke a language of civic piety (especially civil rights) that resonated with crucial aspects of American
moral self-understanding, particularly since such self-understanding
was closely linked to ideals of justice, freedom, and equality. King
and his colleagues creatively reinterpreted documents of ultimate
importance in national life - particularly the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution - in extending the goods at which
they aimed (including democracy, justice, and equality) to blacks
and others excluded from their original intent. 69
Shaped profoundly by the black Christian church, and rooted in
black theological perspectives on love, justice, equality, and freedom
articulated in the rich history of black resistance to racism, King
and his cohorts forged empowering connections between their religious beliefs, and the social, civic, and legal goals to which they
believed their faith committed them. Indeed, they translated their
religious efforts into the language with the best chance to express
their goals in the national arena. For the black church, justice is
68. Of course, King's later beliefs about the necessity for radical social, economic, and moral
transformation of American democracy presented a serious challenge to extant political arrangements. See JAMES H. CONE, MARTIN & MALCOLM & AMERICA: A DREAM OR A NIGHTMARE?
213-43 (1991).
69. Michael Eric Dyson, Martin Luther King, Jr., The Evil of Racism, and the Recovery of
Moral Vision, 44 UNION SEMINARY Q. REV. 85, 88-91 (1990).
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what love sounds like when it speaks in public; civic piety is love's
public language, equality its tone of voice, and freedom its constant
pitch. For Hauerwas and Baxter, such translation may prove problematic, but for black Christians it has meant survival.
Such acts of translation also rest on the black Christian belief
that the entire world belongs to God, that religious truth is not
bound to the sanctuary, and that God often employs apparently disinterested or even hostile persons, forces, and institutions to achieve
the divine prerogative. This truth can be partially glimpsed in the
popularity of the scripture: "[Y]ou meant evil against me; but God
meant it for good .... -7o This often quoted passage forms one of
the most visible hermeneutic strategies employed in the black
church that reflects a strong doctrine of providence, and a serviceable theodicy geared toward black survival and a momentous confrontation with suffering and evil.
For prophetic black Christians, not only is speaking the language
of civil society not taboo, but the messages of God are likewise not
limited to homiletical proclamation, theological discourse, or other
ecclesial expressions of God-talk. Since the world belongs to God,
and the powers that exist, even if evil-intentioned, may have good
consequences in the eyes of faith, God can use whatever forum necessary to deliver divine gift or judgment. This whole theological approach is implicit in the statement by a jubilant black person who,
upon hearing of the Supreme Court decision declaring segregated
transportation in Montgomery, Alabama unconstitutional 7 1 exclaimed, "God Almighty has spoken from Washington, D.C." 72 For
black Christians, God is the original and ultimate polyglot. The language of civic piety (especially civil rights) serves God's purposes, as
does the language of theological study and religious devotion. Thus,
the civil rights movement helped foster a progressive understanding
of the relation between religion and politics that rested on precedents of such interaction in American civil religion.
I have given this severely abbreviated genealogy and justification
of the positive relation of religion to politics in African-American
Christianity to suggest the rich resources it contains for critical
thinking about the relation between church and society. The pro70. Genesis 50:20.
71. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
72. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., STRIDE TOWARD
(1958).
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gressive and prophetic black church, as I have sketched it here, rejects the premises of Hauerwas and Baxter's arguments about the
relation of faith and politics. Faith has a large part to play in the
public arena, but only if it will redescribe its goals in languages that
are publicly effective, accompanied by the politics with the best
chance to make those goals concrete and relevant. Black Christianity avoids attempts to impose Christianity on the world, a strategy
as old as religious establishment and as new as national attempts to
manipulate God for political favor.7" Rather, it retains the strengths
and insights of religious belief while making arguments for the common good and public interest that are subject to criticism and open
to revision because they are neither final nor infallible.
Its history prevents black Christianity from endorsing Hauerwas
and Baxter's pessimistic views about the ability of Christian faith to
mix with politics without losing its soul, without surrendering its capacity to criticize liberal democracy. Hauerwas and Baxter are right
to remind us that Christian faith is in perennial tension with all
political accounts of the good. Indeed, the history of African-American prophetic Christianity is the story of the relentless criticism of
failed American social practices, the constant drawing attention to
conflicts between political ideals and realities, and the ageless renewal of a commitment to broaden the bounds of liberty so that
democracy is both noun and adjective, both achievement and process. But some political accounts of the good are better than others,
and only those Christian communities willing to risk the erosion and
expansion of certain aspects of their Christian identity in secular
affairs have the opportunity to affect the public interest for the
better.
This of course is why Hauerwas and Baxter's views of the various
problems associated with the freedom of religion are viewed suspiciously by the prophetic black Christian church. By avoiding the
nasty and brutal sphere of politics, Hauerwas and Baxter cannot
adequately account for the black struggle and suffering endured to
receive the freedoms the First Amendment guarantees. Black Christians have always understood that the batteries are not included,
that American ideals, principles, and promises are never given, but
73. See William Safire, God Bless Us. N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1992, at A23 (commenting on
attempts by both Democrats and Republicans to use God's name "as a symbol for other side's
immorality, much as the American flag was used in previous campaigns as a symbol for the other
side's lack of patriotism"). -
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must be secured through political struggle in the public realm. With
74
Fish, they recognize that the "game has always been politics.
Hauerwas and Baxter's account not only masks the social and political roots of their own faith, but it effectively discounts the experience of black Christians who provide precisely the sort of example
of the relation between church and politics that might have a
chance of bringing greater clarity to this complex debate.
Finally, black prophetic Christians are wary of theological discussions that reduce the social embodiment of Christianity to the
church, and that portray the state as the enemy of Christian freedom. If theological justifications of slavery had not done so before,
white Christian opposition to the civil rights movement chastened
black Christian expectation of their moral and religious support of
the goal of African-American liberation.76 While arguing that the
role of the church was to attend to the spiritual aspects of life in the
church while avoiding the acrimonious and schismatic business of
politics at all costs, many white Christian churches ironically furnished ideological and theological support to the forces which impeded the progress of the civil rights movement.76
The greater and more tragic irony, however, is that often white
Christians actively opposed black progress by participating in White
Citizens' Councils, the. Ku Klux Klan, or other hate groups that
harassed and even murdered black Christians. Even if they did not
actively participate in such heinous crimes, many white Christians
"retreated into the womb of an ahistorical piety. ' ' 77 By adopting po'sitions similar to those that Hauerwas and Baxter suggest, these
white Christians were rendered impotent to affect the lives of their
black Christian colleagues because their theological stance was
deeply apolitical and hence unable to make claims on the public
good in ways that were immediately helpful to black Christians.
Moreover, it was not the white Church-qua-Church that called
for the end of such barbaric and evil practices, or that actively intervened to prevent the murder and maiming of black life. It was the
74. Fish, supra note 39, at 243.
75. See, e.g., Playboy Interview: Martin Luther King, Jr., reprinted in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE:
THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING. JR. 340, 345-46 (James M.
Washington ed., 1986) (discussing King's disappointment with the white church).
76. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail, in A TESTAMENT OF
HOPE, supra note 75, at 289-302 (reproducing King's famous response to white clergymen who
deemed his actions in Birmingham, Alabama as "unwise and untimely").
77. ERNEST T. CAMPBELL, LOCKED IN A RooM WITH OPEN DOORS (1974).
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sustained social and political struggle of a tiny band of black prophetic Christians and their allies who, by sacrificial action, civil disobedience, and appeals to the American conscience by means of the
language of civic piety, forced the state to intervene through legal
and political measures. Similar to the religious situation of colonial
America during Revolutionary times, the state intervened to prevent
one group of Christians from killing others. Once again, legal proscription and political power had put into law what Christian belief
had professed but failed to practice. And black Christians interpreted such intervention as an extension of the providence of God
over even secular political structures, as black Christians heard God
Almighty speaking from Washington, D.C. This does not mean that
the state is uncritically praised as the unwavering instrument of divine deliverance. It is, however, one of the legitimate means available to black Christians seeking to secure and protect their freedom
so long denied by law and Christian practice.
B.

The Bad Example

The poverty of Hauerwas and Baxter's vision of the social embodiment of Christianity becomes even more evident when they return
to one of the bleakest epochs in modern Catholic Christendom, the
papacy of Pope Pius XI, to draw examples of Christ's Kingship.
Pope Pius XI, according to Hauerwas and Baxter, "boldly and
bluntly asserts the importance of publicly recognizing and celebrating the Kingship of Christ in reconstituting the entire social order. ' '78 The whole point behind the feast celebrating Christ's Kingship was to emphasize that "the common good is to be defined by
Christ."7 Furthermore, Hauerwas and Baxter claim that in opposition to Will's celebration of the secularism that led to the subordination of religion to politics, "Pope Pius XI sees such a subordination
as the undoing of any true politics." 80 Finally, Pope Pius XI, according to Hauerwas and Baxter, "resists the urge to conceive of politics
in anything less than soteriological terms." 8 '
But Pope Pius XI is precisely the sort of figure who is an example
of Hauerwas and Baxter's worst fears: he promoted the moral subordination of Christianity to the political order. By signing a Con78.
79.
80.
81.

Hauerwas & Baxter, supra note 1, at 121.
Id.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 124.
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cordat with Mussolini in 1929, Pope Pius XI made Mussolini's regime the first government in modern Catholic history to receive
official recognition by the Vatican, thus supplying theological justification to the dictator's murderous Fascist maneuvers."' Pius XI "deliberately sabotaged democracy, the strongest opponent of Communism, for the politically and morally ruinous experiment of
Fascism.""3 Pius XI was also a particularly cruel foe of religious
tolerance and diversity.
Pius XI facilitated the "marriage of convenience" between Catholicism and Fascism that helped to destroy the Popolari (the
Christian Democratic Party), the People's Party, which was the second legitimate party in parliament and the only real alternative to
the Fascists.84 More viciously, he requested the resignation of priest
Don Sturzo as general secretary of the Popolari, banishing him
from Rome at the height of the Popolari'sfight against Mussolini.
After his departure, the Fascists moved to expand their efforts to
"wipe out the 'white' trade-unions, co-operatives, and youth organizations." 8 Pius XI also used his proximity to Mussolini to repress
the freedom of religious minorities, urging Mussolini to restrict
Protestant missions in Italy and to outlaw freemasons. Pius XI was
pleased when Mussolini prevented the building of a Muslim mosque
in Rome, and when the dictator persecuted Waldensians, Pentecostalists, the Salvation Army, and eventually Jews.8" After the Concordat of 1929, Mussolini exempted priests from taxation and employed public funds to prevent the financial collapse of Catholic
banks.87

Most appallingly, the official pact between Mussolini and Pius XI
led to the Vatican's declaration that the dictator was a man "sent
by providence." 88 Pius XI compromised the politically independent,
socially prophetic, and morally insubordinate voice of the church by
officially colluding with Mussolini's Fascist Party to stamp out democracy, restrict the religious freedom of other denominations and
religions, and betray some of the church's own priests and members
in an effort to placate Mussolini. As Denis Mack Smith says, Mus82. DENIS MACK SMITH, MUSSOLINI: A BIOGRAPHY 161 (1982).
83. JAMES HASTINGS NICHOLS, DEMOCRACY AND THE CHURCHES 186 (1951).

84. Id. at 182. See also

SMITH,

supra note 82, at 65.

85. NICHOLS, supra note 83, at 183.

86. SMITH, supra note 82, at 159, 163.
87. Id. at 159-61.
88. Id. at 163. See also NICHOLS, supra note 83, at 189.
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solini claimed that "the Church, as a result of their treaty, was no
longer free but subordinate to the State . . . ."" During Mussolini's dictatorship, and because of Pope Pius XI's fatal compromise,
this was tragically true.
The Concordat with Mussolini is the infamous political legacy of
Pius XI's reign. He is hardly the figure to whom we should turn in
thinking about Christ's Kingship. Even Hauerwas and Baxter's
statements about Pius XI's insistence on the link between soteriology and politics seem more appropriately elaborated, and less severely compromised, by contemporary exponents of that belief, especially liberation theologians.90 And although most liberation
theologians are completely committed to the radical transformation
of society in light of Christ's Kingship - and equipped with penetrating social analysis, progressive political activity, and broad historical investigation - few are willing to exclusively identify the
Kingdom of Christ with the Kingdom of this world. Pius XI failed
to remember Hauerwas and Baxter's lesson: that Christianity is in
extreme tension with all accounts of the political good.
Given Hauerwas's belief in the unity of the virtues, the choice of
Pius XI - a pope who was antidemocratic, unfaithful in fateful
ways to the church and its Lord, and intolerant of religious and political freedom - as the best exponent of the Kingship of Christ is
not only unfortunate, it is no less than tragic.91 But then, given the
89. SMITH, supra note 82, at 162.
90. 1 have in mind here liberation theologians who link notions of Christian salvation with
sharp forms of social analysis that get at the economic, political, and social forces which mask
liberation in concrete form. See, e.g., FRANZ J. HINKELAMMERT, THE IDEOLOGICAL WEAPONS OF
DEATH: A THEOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF CAPITALISM (Phillip Berryman trans., 1986).

Also, it seems that Hauerwas's desires to make the church more socially relevant are also better
served by citing the works of black, feminist, and liberation theologians. Especially in regard to
liberation theology, Paul Lauritzen argues that Hauerwas has a great deal in common with Latin
American theologian Johannes Metz, particularly each author's use of narrative in their work. For
example, Lauritzen has written:
Although these writers represent different religious traditions, both rely in significant
ways on the category of narrative in their work. . . . [B]oth Metz and Hauerwas are
concerned to revitalize Christian faith, both want to make it once again socially relevant, and both are adamant that it retain its distinctiveness. That both should also
place such a heavy emphasis on the concept of narrative . . .is not coincidental.
Paul Lauritzen, Is 'Narrative'Really a Panacea? The Use of 'Narrative' in the Work of Metz
and Hauerwas, 67 J. RELIGION 322, 323 (1987).
91. 1 am not suggesting that all of Pius Xl's views about the social order are captured in the
"Kingship of Christ." His encyclical Quadraiqesimo Anno, issued in 1931, remains one of Catholicism's most impressive statements containing the social teachings of the church, including government's role in society and in the economy, the belief in a just wage, a laborer's right to organize,
and strong Christian criticism of both capitalism and socialism. But this document must be juxta-

1992)

AMERICAN SOCIETY AND CHRISTIAN FAITH

159

dilemmas I have shown Hauerwas and Baxter to be trapped by, and
their refusal to engage the nitty-gritty world of real politics, their
misled -

and misleading -

choice is sadly predictable.

Hauerwas and Baxter have largely missed the major areas of concern in the struggles to relate church and state, and religion and
politics, because they have not viewed these matters from the perspective of those who suffered for the freedom to worship and practice their beliefs. The political struggle to implement democratic
ideals in our society is the real story behind the First Amendment.
It is about much more than the wall that separates church and
state. If the truth be told, however, the real wall of separation most
grievous to American Christianity and the Church of Christ is not
between church and state; it remains the wall between black and
white. About that, Hauerwas and Baxter have nothing to say.

posed to Pius Xl's antidemocratic actions and statements during the reign of Mussolini. Neither

am I suggesting personal perfection as a criterion to determine the acceptability of an intellectual
position; in that case, my example of King would be immediately nullified. I am suggesting however, that these characteristics of Pope Pius XI that I have sketched have direct bearing on the
principles and proposals under discussion; there is an organic link, I would argue, between Pope
Pius Xl's views and practices regarding democracy, Fascism, and the morally subordinate status
of the Catholic Church, and his recommendations about the Kingship of Christ. His views are
suspect precisely because they have to do with his moral and theological failures in his office as
pope, the official head of the Catholic Church.

